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Research indicates that evaluated people form positively biased
impressions of their evaluators

(eg.,

Pepitone, 1950; Stevens

8c

Fiske, 1995).

It

has been hypothesized that the extreme control deprivation associated with
evaluation leads to positive impressions, even in face of contrary evidence, for

two reasons:

and

(2) positive

1995).

accuracy and individuation are viewed as

(1)

expectancies protect threatened self-esteem (Stevens

An experiment was performed

as well as

less useful strategies,

in

8c Fiske,

order to investigate these hypotheses

two potential mediators (self-esteem threat and anxiety) and two

potential moderators (trait self-esteem

biased impressions.

and relationship orientation) of

Regarding the mediators,

it

self-esteem threat increased, impressions would

anxiety increased, impressions would

moderators,

it

was hypothesized

would be biased

to perceive a

good performance, while low

was hypothesized

become more

become more

that: (1)

high

that: (1) as

and

(2) as

Turning

to the

biased,

categorical.

positively

trait self-esteem participants

competent evaluator who would recognize
trait self-esteem participants

their

would be biased

to

would be easy to discount.
perceive an incompetent evaluator whose evaluation
VI

and

(2) relations-oriented (high

LPC)

participants

would believe

their

relationship with the evaluator was threatened by the impending evaluation

and would be more

A

positively biased than task-oriented (low

non-dependent control group was included

study did replicate previous research (Stevens
that evaluated people
their evaluators.

were

less clear.

do use

for

&

participants.

comparison purposes. The
Fiske, 1995)

positively biased strategies to

However, the

LPC)

and demonstrated

form impressions of

roles of the potential mediators

and moderators

Discussion of the results concludes with the proposal of a

potentially clarifying study.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

A

[person]

its

being

I

such a complex

is

temporarily class [a thing] under, makes

other aspects.
another,

excuse

is

I

Whichever one of these aspects of

fact....

But as

am

I

always

am

classing

always unjust, always

partial,

necessity-the necessity which

My

lays

upon me.

my

doing, and

I

thinking

is first

it

and

my
last

me

unjust to the

under one aspect or

always exclusive.
finite

and

My

practical nature

and always

for the sake of

can only do one thing at a time. (James, 1890/1983,

pp. 959-60)

People have goals that depend on other people, and, as James reminds
us, these goals

may

bias perception. Yet, initially,

modern

social cognitive

psychologists focused on cognition to the neglect of goals and motivation.

However, recently,
Social perceivers

social cognitive theorists

now

have returned

are viewed as motivated tacticians

to their roots.

who

consider their

social interaction goals before choosing cognitive strategies (Fiske

1991; Fiske, 1993; Forgas, 1992; Hilton

&

&

Taylor,

Darley, 1991; Kunda, 1987; Klein

&

Kunda, 1992).

Even within the motivated
social cognitive research

tactician perspective, however, the bulk of

has examined mainly two types of goals:

(1)

accuracy-oriented goals, which promote individuated, detailed (but not
necessarily accurate) impressions, and (2) expectancy-confirming goals, which

promote quick, good-enough (but not necessarily inaccurate) impressions
1

(for

a review, see Fiske, 1993).

But,

many

goals

may have

little to

do with

attempting to form accurate or expectancy-confirming
impressions. Goals can
lead to specific, directional biases in person
perception.

Evalu ation and Person Perception

Whether one’s aim

is

to

earn a loan or to earn a doctorate, reaching a

goal often depends on the good-will of at least temporarily
powerful
evaluators.

The powerless, evaluated members

relationships, in

of such asymmetrical power

which evaluators have complete control over the outcomes,

are motivated to navigate their evaluation successfully in order
to reach their
goal.

One way

to cope with the potentially threatening nature of

upcoming evaluation

is

an

to believe truly in the good-will of the evaluator, to

engage in wishful thinking.
In

fact,

evaluators.

evaluated people do form positively biased perceptions of their

As

early as 1950, Pepitone found evidence of distortions in a

positive direction.

who were dependent on

People,

evaluators, overestimated

how much

the most negative evaluator liked them

and underestimated how much influence

More recent research
their evaluator

Compared

this

person had on group decisions.

also indicates that evaluated people positively reframe

and engage

to people

a group of three

in wishful thinking (Stevens

who were

not evaluated, people

&

Fiske, 1995).

who were

evaluated

spent most of their time on any negative information that was available,
discounted this negative information, and formed a positively biased

impression of the powerful evaluator.

2

Positive biases in person perception
also occur under a different

evaluative social structure: initial romantic
interdependence.

People seeking

romantic relationships are evaluated by others
who decide whether to accept
or reject

them

as potential partners.

Indeed, researchers have found that

perceivers think positively about a potential date
(Berscheid, Graziano,

Monson,

&

Dermer, 1976; Stephan, Berscheid,

recent set of studies, people

who

&

Walster, 1971).

In one

expected to date someone, compared to those

who

did not, viewed their potential date as competent even

was

not.

when

the person

Incompetent targets were judged just as favorably as competent

ones (Fiske, Goodwin, Rosen,

&

Rosenthal, 1994).

Existing Explanations for Positive Biases

Some attempts have been made
biases in person perception.

to explain these positive, directional

Early researchers simply argued that people

who

are dependent on another person tend to arrive at wish-fulfilling conclusions

about the person’s dispositions (Berscheid

Stephan

et

al.,

1971).

et al, 1976; Pepitone, 1950;

However, pure task outcome dependency, simply being

dependent on another person

in the absence of evaluation

teammates), does not result in positive biases (Erber

&

Fiske, 1987; Ruscher

More

&

&

(e.g.,

as

Fiske, 1984;

Neuberg

Fiske, 1990).

recently, Stevens

and Fiske (1995) hypothesized that evaluated

people form positive impressions of their evaluators (and potential romantic
partners), even in face of contrary evidence, for two reasons: (1) evaluated

perceivers neglect accuracy and individuation as less useful strategies and
,

3

(2)

evaluated perceivers attempt to protect threatened
self-esteem with positive
expectancies
First,

.

with regard to the

strategies, normally,

when

utility of

accuracy and individuating

people are outcome dependent, they individuate

the other person in order to increase their sense of prediction
and control

(Erber

&

&

Fiske, 1984;

Fiske, 1995).

Neuberg

&

Fiske, 1987; Ruscher

&

Fiske, 1990; Stevens

However, these accuracy-motivated strategies occur only

in

pure task-oriented situations, perhaps because these outcome dependent
people feel that they have some potential personal control; they will perform

some of the work.
In contrast, evaluativelv dependent people

may

opportunities personally to control their outcomes.

dependent people do perform

makes

^ the

decisions.

well,

it

may

perceive fewer

Even

if

evaluatively

not matter; the powerful evaluator

So, evaluatively dependent people

accuracy and individuation as useless strategies. In

fact,

may

a recent study by

Copeland (1994) revealed that evaluatively dependent people
less

give up on

in

dyads were

motivated to learn about their partner than were the powerful people.
Second, with regard to the protective nature of positive expectancies,

evaluation not only provides feedback about performance on a task, but also

provides information regarding the evaluated person’s inherent worth. Thus,
the powerful person’s evaluation potentially threatens the perceiver’s

esteem.

People

may

self-

connect their evaluation to their self-view, which lasts

well beyond the immediate setting; a single small task outcome does not
typically

have the same kind of lasting

effects.

4

Thus, evaluated people

may

feel that

a competent evaluator

therefore, favorably.

As a

Is

most

likely to evaluate

them

fairly and,

result, people’s perceptions of their
evaluators

may

be positively biased.

Thus, theoretically, people’s positively biased perceptions
of evaluators
are affected by both the extreme loss of control and
the threat associated with
evaluation.

However, no data

directly address

how

control deprivation and

self-esteem threat operate together.

Control and Self-Esteem

Control deprivation

is

linked to self-esteem.

Loss of control does more

than simply motivate people to regain control. Control
it

loss signals a threat;

suggests a shortcoming in people’s abilities to cope with a demanding

environment (Strube

&

Yost, 1993).

In fact, the self-esteem maintenance hypothesis posits that low control

threatens people’s self-esteem (Alloy

One way

1980).

&

Abramson, 1979; Abramson

people cope with this threat

is

&

Alloy,

to overestimate their control

over subsequent positive outcomes. Thus, the protection of threatened

esteem

may

partially determine people’s

see Alloy, Clements,

&

judgments of control

self-

(for a review,

Koenig, 1993).

According to self-affirmation theory

(Steele, 1988), control deprivation

activates a simple self-affirmation motive, a motive to affirm an image of

competency and

ability to control

outcomes. Under threat, a self-affirmation

motive may, for example, increase self-serving attributions that protect or

enhance the self Externalizing the causes of poor performance and
internalizing the causes of good performance are examples of such self-serving

5

attributions (Jones

Other

&

Berglas, 1978;

Weary

&

Arkin, 1981; Weiner, 1985).

strategies, such as attributing positive
characteristics to

are also self-protecting and self-serving (Stevens

&

an evaluator,

Fiske, 1995).

Self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) further argues that
simply

explaining an event
Heller, 1987).

may imply knowledge and competency

(cf.,

&

Pittman

Consequently, a self-affirmation motive could increase

attributions about events unrelated to the self or to the threat

1975, 1988; Steele,

&

Lui, 1981; Steele

&

Lui, 1983).

(e.g.,

Steele,

In other words, the

affirmation motive aroused by control deprivation can be assuaged by

self-

self-

affirmation on dimensions unrelated to the threat or by attributions about

others unconnected to the

self.

In

fact,

while control-deprived people

normally make more attributions than non-control-deprived people (Lui
Steele, 1986;

Pittman

&

D’Agostino, 1989; Pittman

&

&

Pittman, 1980), the

attributions of control-deprived people given the opportunity to engage in

affirmation on a value dimension important to the

self,

self-

but unrelated to the

control-deprivation experience, do not differ from non-control-deprived people
(Lui

&

Steele, 1986).

It is

important to note that

all

of the research on self-affirmation

increasing attributions about others was conducted in non-evaluative
situations.

people

who

In

fact,

consistent with self-affirmation theory, outcome dependent

are not evaluated by a powerful other do increase their

attributional activity about the powerful other.

These attributions are

accuracy-oriented and individuate the powerful other, but they are not
protective or self-serving (Stevens

&

Fiske, 1995).

6

self-

However, the evaluative nature of most power
relationships may

overwhelm people’s

ability to self-affirm

by way of unrelated attributions.

Instead, the extreme self-esteem threat
associated with such a great loss of

control

may

force evaluatively dependent powerless
people to resort to

direct self-protective

and

more

self-serving attributions, such as forming
positively

biased impressions of the evaluator.

Self-Esteem and Control:

Links to Anxiety

At a minimum, as well as being linked
that threatened self-esteem

is

to control deprivation,

clearly related to anxiety.

Anxiety and anxiety-

related problems are correlated negatively with self-esteem

1968, Lipsitt, 1958; Rosenberg

&

Simmons, 1972),

we know

(e.g.,

self-report

French,

and

physiological indexes indicate that threats to self-esteem produce anxiety

Bennett

&

Holmes, 1975; Burish

esteem reduces anxiety

Mehlman &

(e.g.,

&

Houston, 1979), and the defense of

Bennett

&

(e.g.,

self-

Holmes, 1975; Hakmiller, 1966;

Snyder, 1985). In addition, proponents of terror management

theory, for example, argue that self-esteem provides protection against anxiety
in response to threat (Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, Rosenblatt, Burling,

Lyon, Simon,

&

Pinel, 1992).

for feelings of control;

it is

Apparently, self-esteem

also

is

important not only

an important piece of managing anxiety.

Protecting self-esteem appears to be an effective

way

to reduce anxiety.

Furthermore, the control deprivation associated with outcome

dependency also leads

to anxiety.

People whose outcomes are controlled by

powerful outgroup members report feeling that their outcomes are
their

own

control than people

less

under

whose outcomes are controlled by ingroup
7

members

(D6pret, 1994).

In addition, people controlled by outgroup

members

reported feeling more jittery, unhappy, and angry,
and less calm and happy

than people controlled by ingroup members (Depret,
1994).

These anxious people want

to regain control.

However, anxiety

generates a simultaneous capacity decrement and heightened
control
motivation, which both result from intrusive thoughts. While
anxious people

want

to regain control, their capacity

resources (Fiske

&

Emery, 1993). Thus, anxious people may compensate by

trying to control others.

Furthermore, the depleted cognitive resources may

lead to stereotyped thinking (Wilder

people

may appear

decrement takes away the needed

&

Shapiro, 1989a; 1989b).

Categorized

simpler and easier to control than individuated people.

Preliminary experimental and correlational evidence (Fiske

&

Morling, in

press) supports these hypotheses.

In

fact,

the impressions that outcome dependent people form of their

evaluators are categorically positive compared to the impressions of nonevaluatively outcome dependent and baseline people (Stevens

These categorically positive impressions may

result

&

Fiske, 1995).

from the anxiety

experienced by the evaluatively dependent powerless people.

Mediation

According to the above reasoning, the control deprivation associated
with being evaluatively outcome dependent not only leads to threatened
esteem, but

it

also leads to anxiety.

In turn, this self-esteem threat

may

self-

cause

evaluatively dependent people to resort to self-protective attributions,
positively biased impressions of the evaluator.

8

In addition, the anxiety related

to being evaluatively

dependent may cause these impressions of the evaluator

to be categorically positive.

In other words, threatened self-esteem and

feelings of anxiety should mediate the effect
control deprivation has on

people’s perceptions of their evaluator (see Figure

However, being evaluated may not
people

may become

1).

affect all people equally.

Some

extremely threatened and anxious upon learning of an

impending evaluation. These people may protect themselves with a

different

kind of biased impression of their evaluator. Alternatively, some people

may

not be very threatened by an evaluative relationship. These people’s
impressions of their evaluator
characteristics

may moderate

being evaluated.

Two

may

not be biased. In other words, personality

the positively biased perceptions associated with

moderators that

may

affect these processes are trait

self-esteem and relationship orientation.

Trait Self-Esteem
If

all

the threat associated with evaluation

is

perceived in the same

way by

people, regardless of their trait self-esteem, then everyone should be biased

in the

same way.

All evaluatively dependent people should

However,

biased impressions of their evaluators.

esteem or long-term feelings of competency could

it is

form positively

possible that trait self-

affect people’s biases.

In the aforementioned Stevens and Fiske study (1995), on which the

current theoretical reasoning
led to believe they

is

would perform well on the

desired a competent evaluator
favorably.

based, the powerless people were specifically

However,

if

who would

task.

Therefore, they

may have

be likely to evaluate them fairly and

the possibility of failure had been salient, powerless
9

people

may have

evaluator.

A

preferred a different kind of evaluator, an
incompetent

negative evaluation from a competent evaluator
would be

difficult to Ignore,

but a negative evaluation from an incompetent
evaluator

easy to discount. Thus, people with high
self-esteem or a belief that they

be successful on the task
self-esteem they

may

may have

research reviewed earlier.

positive illusions similar to those found in the

However, people with low self-esteem or a

may

evaluator, to protect their self-esteem they

may have

(i.e.,

will

prefer a competent evaluator; to protect their

that they will not be successful on the task

the evaluator

is

belief

prefer an incompetent

negative illusions about

they can discount a negative evaluation

if it

comes from an

incompetent evaluator).
Therefore, the self-protective strategies employed by evaluatively

dependent people may be moderated by
competence).

trait self-esteem (as well as

People with high self-esteem

may

expect to do well in the study,

experience less threat, and desire a competent evaluator.
people with low self-esteem

may

long-term

On

the other hand,

expect to do poorly in the study, experience

great threat, and desire an incompetent evaluator.
Relationship Orientation
Similarly, the

manner

in

which evaluatively dependent perceivers

approach relationships also may moderate their perceptions of evaluators.

Most research on power assumes
oriented relationship.
attentive,

a traditional, individualistic, and task-

However, some types of power are more caretaking,

and relationship-oriented. Evaluatively dependent perceivers who

approach their asymmetrical power relationship with an evaluator
10

in a task-

oriented

those

manner may

who approach

react differently to their impending evaluation
than

their

power relationship

in a

more relationship-oriented

fashion.

Perhaps the most well known model of these individual differences

is

Fiedler’s contingency theory of leadership (Fiedler, 1964;
1967; 1978; Fiedler

&

This work contrasts task-oriented leaders (powerful people),

Garcia, 1987).

who

think poorly of their least preferred co worker (LPC), and relations-

oriented leaders (powerful people),

People

who

who

think less poorly of their LPC.

are attuned to the relationship between the powerful person and

dependent person may be more concerned about interpersonal aspects than
task-related aspects of the relationship.

Thus, high

LPC

(relations-oriented)

people should be particularly concerned with maintaining a positive
relationship.

with leader

There

LPC

is

evidence that follower satisfaction increases linearly

score (Rice, 1981).

High

LPC

followers should also strive to

maintain a positive relationship with their leaders and

may

be motivated to

perceive the powerful in a positive manner.

On

the other hand, people

who

focus on task-related aspects of the

relationship between the powerful person and the dependent person

more

may

be

sensitive to issues such as task-competency than to interpersonal issues.

Thus, low

LPC

(task-oriented) people should be particularly concerned with

maintaining a productive task association.
driven to size up their superiors and

may

Low LPC

followers should be

be motivated to perceive powerful

people with particular regard to their task-competency. These low

11

LPC

followers

may

process competency-related information
about an evaluator

accurately and individuate.

Therefore, the self-protective impression formation
strategies employed

by evaluatively dependent people may be moderated
by their relationship
orientation.

The threat

oriented people,
evaluator,

of evaluation

who want

may

and the threat may lead high LPC followers

may

worry

relations-

to maintain positive associations with their

biased impressions of their evaluator.
evaluation

particularly

On

form positively

to

the other hand, the threat of

not bother task-oriented people,

who want

productive task relationship with their evaluator, and low

to maintain a

LPC

followers

may

In sum, evaluatively dependent people have lost control over their

own

form accurate, competency-based impressions of their evaluator.

Summary and

Predictions

outcomes without retaining control over the powerful person. This control
deprivation, paired with the forthcoming evaluation, threatens evaluatively

dependent people’s self-esteem and produces anxiety. Self-esteem threat
triggers self-affirmation that results in self-protective

attributions about the evaluator:

The evaluator

least before the actual interaction).

Anxiety

will

may

and

self-serving

be viewed positively

(at

cause these impressions of

the evaluator to be categorically positive. Thus, (Hypothesis

1)

self-esteem

threat and anxiety mediate the path from control deprivation to biased
impressions.

Furthermore, the evaluatively dependent person’s
relationship orientation

may moderate

these effects.

12

trait self-esteem

and

(Hypothesis 2) People

with high self-esteem

may

be

less

threatened by the situation and

motivated to view the evaluator as a competent
person

who

their good performance, while people with
low self-esteem

threatened by the situation and

may be

incompetent person whose evaluation

and they may be motivated
task-oriented (low

they

may

to

is

will recognize

may

be more

motivated to view the evaluator as an

will

be easy to discount.

In addition, relations-oriented (high LPC) people
relationship with the evaluator

may be

may

(Hypothesis 3)

believe their

threatened by the impending evaluation,

view the evaluator as positive; alternatively,

LPC) people may be

less

threatened by the evaluation, and

be motivated to accurately perceive the competency of the evaluator.

13

Mediation

of

Model

1.

Figure

14

CHAPTER

2

EXPERIMENT
The experiment

investigates

two potential mediators (self-esteem threat

and anxiety) and two potential moderators

(trait self-esteem

and relationship

orientation) of the directionally biased impressions
evaluatively dependent

people form of their evaluators.

Regarding the mediators, as self-esteem

threat increases, impressions should become more biased.
And, as anxiety
increases, impressions should

become more

categorical.

moderators, high trait self-esteem participants

competent evaluator, while low

may

biased) than task-oriented (low

dependent control group

is

And

to the

be biased to perceive a

trait self-esteem participants

perceive an incompetent evaluator.
participants’ relationships

may

Turning

may

relations-oriented (high

be biased to

LPC)

be more threatened (and therefore more

LPC)

participants’ relationships.

A

non-

included for comparison purposes.

Method
Overview

An

experimenter led participants to believe that their performance

would (evaluative dependency) or would not (no dependency) be evaluated by
a fictitious other,

whom

they expected to meet. In addition, the experimenter

told participants they

would be

their performance (no

dependency subjects were also

eligible for a prize

evaluated, but not by the fictitious other).

The

based on the evaluation of
told they

fictitious

would be

other was initially

portrayed as competent (positive expectation) or incompetent (negative
15

expectation).

Participants then received both positive and
negative

(expectancy-consistent and expectancy-inconsistent)
information about the
fictitious participant

recorder.

and voiced

their reactions to that information into a tape

This created a three-way design with two between-participants

variables (dependency and expectation) and one within-participant
variable

(information valence). In addition, participants’ trait self-esteem and
relationship orientation scores were available from a prescreening
session.

Participants

One hundred seventeen

(82 females

and 35 males) introductory

psychology students from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst
received extra credit for their participation.

Participants were randomly

assigned to one of the four conditions created by the between-participants
variables of dependency and expectation.

The data

of two participants

who

volunteered suspicion about the alleged other participant, one participant

who

understood English poorly, and one participant who was more than two and a
half standard deviations above the

mean on

the critical variable of attention

time were deleted from the analyses. In addition, two participants were
deleted due to experimenter error.^
data.

This

left

Any

other omissions were due to missing

111 participants, 27-29 in each

cell

of the critical two-way

interaction between dependency (a between-participants variable) and

information valence (the within-participants variable). Positivity of

expectancy was included as a counterbalancing variable to unconfound valence

and consistency of the information

received.
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Procedurft

Prior to the experimental session, at
the beginning of the semester,
participants completed a prescreening
questionnaire.

Included in this

questionnaire were the Self-Esteem Scale
(Rosenberg, 1965; see Appendix A)

and the Least-Preferred Coworker Scale

(Fiedler, 1967; see

Appendix

B).

Immediately upon arrival at the experimental session,
participants were
asked to

fill

out a version of the Self-Esteem Scale, modified
to measure state

self-esteem (see Appendix C). After they completed
this questionnaire, the

experimenter explained that a work-study undergraduate
also would be
participating in the study.
participant,

was waiting

in

This alleged person, always the same sex as the

another room. There were several wind-up

toys,

paper, pens, and pencils on the table that presumably would
be used for the
task.

The experimenter
supposedly investigating
task.

briefly explained that the researchers

how

discussion affects performance on a creative

So, later in the study, the experimenter would ask

educational games for children using the wind-up toys.
subtraction could be

were

shown by winding up

them

to think

up

For example,

a toy and letting

it

hop away from

the remaining toys. While explaining the task, the experimenter indicated
that skill and creativity would be helpful.

Supposedly, the experimenter

would be comparing the performance of two groups of subjects-one group of
people

who

discussed their ideas and another group of people

discuss their ideas.
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who

did not

The experimenter then informed

m

participants that they happened to be

the condition of the study in which they
would have the discussion with

the fictitious work-study person.

In

fact, all

participants were in this

"condition."

The experimenter proceeded
incentive, they

to

inform participants that, as extra

would have an opportunity

to earn

some money.

In the no-

dependency condition, a research supervisor would be awarding
the

prizes.

In

the evaluative dependency condition, the fictitious work-study
person with

whom

the participants would be discussing their ideas would be
awarding the

These were $50

prizes.

they understood

how

prizes.

Participants signed a form indicating that

the prizes would be awarded.

In an effort to

make

the

evaluation more salient, participants were also told that they would receive
their evaluation at the

end of the hour before they

The experimenter then
study more

like a real-life

told participants that, in

work

situation, they

information about the person with

The

first

piece of information

person explaining

how

left.

whom

was a

an

effort to

make

the

would be receiving some

they would be discussing their ideas.

brief statement written by the other

well this person expected to do in the discussion.

This

statement served to manipulate participants’ expectancy for the work-study
person.

The competent expectancy statement

might be pretty good
semesters

now and

at this.

I’ve

I’ve

be any good at

this.

done pretty

I

was

"To be honest,

been a teaching assistant
well, especially

The incompetent expectancy statement
I’ll

read:

read:

I

I

for several

with things

like this."

"To be honest. I’m not sure

a teaching assistant last semester, but

18

think

I

if

didn’t

do so great, especially with things

like this."

Participants looked over this

statement while the experimenter walked
down the

work-study person was about ready

hall, allegedly to see if

the

to begin.

After returning, the experimenter asked
participants to go through

some

additional information.

This

trait

information was supposedly taken

from an informal evaluation of the work-study person when
that person was a
teaching assistant. The experimenter told the participants
that their
reactions to this information

would

was of

like to record their reactions

interest to the researchers,

who

initial

thus

on an audiotape. After reassuring

participants of the anonymity of their responses, especially with
respect to the
fictitious

other person, the experimenter asked participants to read each piece

of information aloud and to

comment about

This information was mixed. The

it.

five positive

adjectives: clever, persistent, quick, efficient,

sentences used the

and relaxed. The

five

negative

sentences used the adjectives: irresponsible, vague, superficial, nitpicking, and
sloppy.

(Stevens

These statements were

&

Fiske, 1995)

identical to those used in previous research

and are available

appeared in a different random order
stipulation that no

more than two

for

in

Appendix D. The sentences

each participant, with the

positive or

two negative statements

appeared consecutively.

When

participants finished

commenting on the information about the

work-study person, they were asked to complete three questionnaires. These
questionnaires were arranged in order to capture the less persistent effects
first.

The

first

questionnaire utilized Epstein’s Emotion Triads (see Appendix
19

E) to measure mood, especially anxiety.
The second questionnaire contained
the State Self-Esteem Scale used at the
beginning of the experiment

embedded
Appendix

in the Feelings of
F).

Finally, the third questionnaire (see

participants to rate

how much

Inadequacy Scale^ (Janis

how

&

Field, 1959; see

Appendix G) asked

well the work-study person would do on the
task and

control the work-study person had over their
outcomes.

addition, participants indicated their

perceived control, and

how happy

own competency

In

at the task, their

they were with the work-study person.

Participants also rated the consistency, clarity, and positivity
of their

impression of the work-study person. The questionnaire also asked
participants

how much

how

helpful the information about work-study person

information they would like

order to examine

tlie positivity

if

they were participating again. In

of impressions, participants were asked to rate

the work-study person on a variety of

traits.

check, participants were asked to indicate

performance.

A

In addition, as a manipulation

who would be judging

their

second part of the questionnaire asked participants to recall

the purpose of the experiment and
this questionnaire

comment on

the study thus

far.^

Once

was completed, the experimenter probed participants

suspicion and debriefed them.

when

was and

A random

drawing

for the

for

$50 prizes was held

the study was completed.

Data from protocols

.

From

blind to condition, recorded the
positive

the audiotapes, the experimenter,

number

who was

of seconds participants considered the

and negative information. Timing always commenced when

participants began to read each statement.

20

Participants’ tape-recorded

comments were then coded

&

research (see Stevens

into discrete categories (see Table
1) used in prior

Fiske, 1995).

also classified as discounting or not.

schemes, another individual,
third of the protocols.

=

evaluations, k
repetitions,

k =

discounting, k

=

.87;

assess reliability of both coding

coefficients

dispositions,

=

hedging, k

(median k =

comments was

also blind to condition, coded a

kappa

s

k =

k =

.80;

were computed

matching, k =

no comment, k =

for

k =

.89; elaboration,

.98; attribute

.91; self-reference,

.94

To

who was

Cohen

code type and are as follows:

In addition, each of the

random
each

.84;

.86;

1.00;

and

.89).

Scales

Self-Esteem Scale (Trait)

many

(SES) are related to

.

People’s scores on the Self-Esteem Scale

self-esteem-related constructs.

and Wunderlich (1986) reported a correlation of
confidence and a correlation of .39 between
(1988) found a correlation of .38 between
self-concept.

.65

between SES scores and

SES and

SES

For example, Lorr

popularity.

Reynolds

scores and overall academic

In addition, Fleming and Courtney (1984) demonstrated that

SES

scores correlated .78 with general self-regard, .51 with social confidence,

and

.35

with school

abilities.

A

Cronbach a of

.90

was obtained

for the fall

1994 University of Massachusetts at Amherst prescreening sample and a

Cronbach a of

.90

was

also obtained for the spring 1995 sample.

Least-Preferred Coworker Scale

.

People’s scores of the Least-Preferred

Coworker Scale (LPC) are associated with many relationship orientation
concepts.

For instance, Meuwese (1964) found that high

considerate and that

members

of groups with high

21

LPC

LPC

people are more

leaders tend to be

lower in anxiety, get along better, and
are more
reported that low

LPC

satisfied.

people are more task-oriented than relationship-

oriented and more punitive toward poor coworkers.
that low

LPC

LPC

(1964) found

people derive their major satisfaction from

successful interpersonal relationships while low

fall

Meuwese

people are more efficient and goal-oriented. Finally,
Bishop

(1964) indicated that high

satisfaction

Hawkins (1962)

from task performance.

A

LPC

people derive their major

Cronbach a of

.95

was obtained

for the

1994 University of Massachusetts at Amherst prescreening sample and
a

Cronback a of

.94

was obtained

Epstei n's Emotion Triads

for the spring

1995 sample.

This scale was designed to measure people’s

.

current emotional state (Epstein, 1979). The clusters of three adjectives were

determined by factor analysis of adjective checklists
this experiment,

we were

scores on the jittery-shaky-nervous triad.

was used

as our

measure of

State Self-Esteem Scales

.

trait anxiety is related to

However, using participants
first

In

high

Thus, the jittery-shaky-nervous

state anxiety.

Because these scales have not been used

widely in research, independent validity information

obtained for the

Epstein, 1976).

interested particularly in a triad measuring anxiety.

Morling and Fiske (1994) reported that high

triad

(e.g.,

in this experiment, a

is

not available.

Cronbach a of

.89

was

State Self-Esteem Scale and a Cronbach a of .88 was

obtained for the second State Self-Esteem Scale.
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Results

Manipulation Checks

A

measure of participants’ perceptions of how well the

was expected

to

do in the discussion indicated that the expectancy

manipulation operated as designed. Participants

in the positive expectancy

condition expected the other person to do better in the discussion

than did participants in the negative expectancy condition (M =
F(l,107)

=

other

fictitious

238.74,

MSE =

3.50,

p <

.0001.“*

(M =

9.25)

3.79),

This accurately reflects the

information these participants were given.
In addition, significantly more participants than would be expected by

chance correctly answered the questionnaire item asking who would be
judging their performance, t(llO) = 8.21,

most of the participants understood

SE =

whom

5.24,

p <

.001.

Therefore,

they were told would be judging

their performance.

Contrary to previous research (Stevens

main

effect for

&

Fiske, 1995), there

was not a

dependency on the measure of how much control the other

person had over whether the participant won the

were not dependent did not

differ

prize.

Participants

who

from those who where evaluatively

dependent. The item measuring the other person’s control was on the
questionnaire and several

new

scales

were added

final

to the study prior to this

final questionnaire.

These new scales may have affected measures on the

final questionnaire.

This possibility will be addressed in the discussion.
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Timed Attention

The

total

number

of seconds participants attended to positive
and

negative attribute information was entered into a
2
analysis of variance

(ANOVA) on Dependency

Expectation (positive, negative)

X

This analysis yielded two main

effects.

condition spent

more time on the

=

744.59,

(Stevens

&

p <

.01.

Fiske, 1995)

participants require

X

(none, evaluative)

trait

Participants in the evaluative

(M =

information

more time than other

on negative

trait

(M =

148.77 seconds) than

127.76), F(l,106)

=

8.12,

information

(M =

participants in order to discount

In addition,

information (M

A

2 mixed model

and may indicate that evaluatively dependent

trait information.

not unusual.

X

This effect has been found in previous research

some of the

is

2

Information Valence (positive, negative).

participants in the no dependency condition

MSE

X

=

63.61), F(l,106)

all

participants spent

more time

74.65 seconds) than positive trait

=

46.24,

MSE =

145.90,

p <

.0001.^

This

great deal of person perception research has indicated that,

in general, negative information

information (see Skowronski

&

is

considered more informative than positive

Carlston, 1989).

Mediators
Self-Esteem Threat

.

Self-esteem threat was operationalized as the

difference between each participant’s state self-esteem score at the beginning

of the experimental session (State Self-Esteem Scale) and each participant’s
state self-esteem score after the think-aloud protocol (State Self-Esteem Scale

within Feelings of Inadequacy Scale).® These two state self-esteem measures

used different response scales and, therefore, could not be compared directly
24

to one another.
score.

Thus, the each state self-esteem score
was converted to a

z-

Self-esteem threat was computed by
subtracting the second measure

from the

Therefore, threat would be indicated by a
negative difference

first.

score.

This difference score was entered into a 2

Dependency (none, evaluative) and Expectation
independent variables.

It

X

2

ANOVA,

using

(positive, negative) as the

was hypothesized that participants expecting

evaluation would be more threatened by the evaluation
than other
participants.

However, there was no main

effect for

outcome dependency

condition.

In addition, self-esteem threat was hypothesized to predict
the degree
of bias in participants’ impressions of the evaluator.
of discounting

comments made by

difference score.

participants

Thus, the total number^

was regressed on

this

This regression was not significant.

State Anxiety.

State anxiety was operationalized as each participant’s

score on the jittery-shaky-nervous triad of Epstein’s Emotion Triads.
score

was entered

and Expectation

into a 2

X

2

ANOVA,

This

using Dependency (none, evaluative)

(positive, negative) as the

independent variables.

It

was

hypothesized that participants expecting evaluation would be more anxious

than other participants. However, there was no main

effect for

outcome

dependency condition.
Furthermore, state anxiety was hypothesized to predict the degree of
bias in participants’ impressions of the evaluator.
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Thus, the total number of

discounting comments
score.

made by

participants

was regressed on

this difference

This regression was not significant.

Moderators^
Trait Self-Esteem

.

It

was predicted that low self-esteem

participants

would be more threatened by the evaluation than high self-esteem
participants.

In order to investigate this hypothesis, a median split was

performed on the Self-Esteem Scale, and a 2

on the self-esteem threat

variable, using

X

2

X

2

ANOVA» was

Dependency (none, evaluative).

Expectation (positive, negative, and Scale Score (bottom

half, top half) as the

independent variables. This analysis did not yield the predicted
It also

was predicted that low

conducted

effect.

self-esteem participants would be

more

negatively biased in their perceptions of the evaluator’s traits than high

esteem participants. In order to investigate

was performed on the Self-Esteem
conducted on the

trait

Scale,

this hypotheses, a

and

median

measures, using Dependency (none, evaluative).
half, top half) as the

independent variables. None of these analyses yielded the predicted
Relationship Orientation

participants.

split

2X2X2 ANOVAs were

Expectation (positive, negative, and Scale Score (bottom

participants would be

self-

.

It

effect.

was predicted that relations-oriented

more threatened by the evaluation than task-oriented

In order to investigate this hypothesis, a median split was

performed on the Least-Preferred Co worker Scale, and a 2

was conducted on the self-esteem threat

variable, using

X

2

X

2

AN OVA

Dependency

(none, evaluative). Expectation (positive, negative, and Scale Score (bottom
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half, top

halo as the independent variables. This analysis
did not yield the

predicted effect.
It

also

was predicted that

relations-oriented participants’ perceptions of

the evaluator would be more biased than
task-oriented participants’
perceptions.

In order to investigate this hypothesis, a median
split was

performed on the Least-Preferred Coworker

were conducted on the

trait

Scale,

and

2X2X2 ANOVAs

measures, using Dependency (none,evaluative).

Expectation (positive, negative, and Scale Score (bottom

half, top

halO as the

independent variables. These analyses did not yield the predicted

The

trait

measures were on the

final questionnaire and, as

the absence of effects on the final questionnaire
addition of

new measures

effect.

mentioned,

may have been due

prior to the questionnaire.

to the

Furthermore, the new

measures were the measures of state self-esteem and

As

state anxiety.

discussed, these mediators also did not behave as predicted.

Think-aloud Protocols

For each comment type that was used by
participants, the

entered into a 2
evaluative)

X

number

X

2

X

of such

at least

comments served

2 mixed-model

AN OVA

Expectation (positive, negative)

10%

of the

as the dependent variable

on Dependency (none,

X

Information Valence (positive,

negative).

Discounting

.

The

ANOVA

indicated that evaluatively dependent

participants discounted the information

dependent participants (M =
replicating previous findings.

more (M =

2.04), F(l,106)

=

8.64,

3.45) than did non-

MSE =

3.24,

p <

.005,

In addition, a marginal dependency by valence
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interaction, F(l,106)=3.50,

MSE

=

2.82,

^ =

.064, indicated that while

both

non-dependent and evaluatively dependent participants
discounted more
negative

M

-

(M =

1.85

and

M

=

2.98, respectively)

than positive (M = 0.18 and

0.47, respectively) information, this difference

evaluatively dependent participants (see Figure

research, this increased discounting

2).

may have been

was much

larger for

As found

in previous

in

an

effort to interpret

the information about the evaluator in a positive manner.

Mediation

In addition, self-esteem threat and state anxiety were

.

predicted to mediate the effect of dependency on impression
bias.

know

We

already

that dependency did not predict self-esteem threat or state anxiety.

However, additional analyses indicated that dependency did predict
discounting, 6

=

.27, t(l)

=

p <

2.71,

Further analyses indicated that

.05.

neither self-esteem threat nor state anxiety reduced the predictive power of

dependency. Thus, neither self-esteem threat nor state anxiety could be
considered a mediator of the effect of dependency on discounting (Baron

Kenny, 1986). Once again, the measures of state self-esteem and

&

state anxiety

did not behave as predicted.
Positivity bias

were valence

effects.

Most of the other

.

The

significant effects for the

participants seemed

positive aspects of the other.

Participants

comments

more comfortable with the

made more

dispositional

comments

about the positive information (M = 3.77) than the negative information (M

=

2.30), F(l,106)

=

comments about the
information

(M =

54.42,

MSE

=

2.19,

p <

positive information

2.40), F(l,106)

=

6.95,
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.0001,

(M =

and more evaluative

4.29) than the negative

=

1.03,

p <

.01.^"

On

the

other hand, participants discounted more negative
information (M = 2.42)

than positive (M =

0.33), F(l,106)

addition, participants

made more

negative information

(M =

F(l,106)

more

=

51.19,

MSE =

=

MSE =

85.50,

elaborations

2.82,

p < .0001. In

(many discounting) about the

4.82) than the positive information

2.99,

p < .0001.“

(M =

Similarly, participants

attribute connections for the negative information

(M =

3.15),

made

0.60, mostly

indicating disagreement with positive information) than the positive

information

(M =

0.26), F(l,106)

=

11.24,

MSE

=

p <

0.56,

.

more hedges were made about the negative information (M =

005.^2

Finally,

4.19) than the

positive information

(M =

These findings seem

to indicate that participants preferred to view the other

3.54), F(l,106)

=

9.86,

MSE

=

2.43,

p <

.005.^^

person in a positive rather than a negative manner. While they discounted,
elaborated, and hedged about the negative information, they preferred to

make

dispositional inferences

and comment on the valence of the

positive

comments.
Inaccuracy

A main

effect for

expectancy indicated that positive expectancy

participants believed the other person would have

more

control over the

experimental outcome (M = 6.91) than negative expectancy participants (M =
5.82), F(l,107)

=

4.90,

MSE

=

6.93,

p <

.05.

In an earlier study, Stevens and

Fiske (1995, Experiment 3) reported a similar finding; across dependency
conditions, positive expectancy participants believed the other person would

have more control than negative expectancy participants. In the present
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experiment, this inaccurate perception
occurs for both dependency conditions

and appears

to reflect wishful thinking

by

all

Finally, in previous research (Stevens

participants.

&

Fiske, 1995), the elevated level

of discounting, especially of negative
information, observed in the evaluated
participants
traits.

was mirrored by a

positivity bias in perceptions of the evaluator’s

In this previous work, while non-dependent
perceivers accurately

reported the valence of the other person’s

traits,

evaluated perceivers inflated

the positivity of the negative evaluator’s traits and
equated them with the
traits of the positive evaluator.

this study.

The absence

However, these results were not replicated

of these effects will be addressed next.
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in

Table

1.

Content Categories for Participants’ Comments
about Target Information

Category

Explanation

Disposition

Inference about target’s traits, tendencies,

Elaboration

Interpretation of

likes.

what the information means

or

implies.

Evaluation

Evaluation without interpretation.

Hedging

Comment
pause

Attribute matching

not directed at anything in particular.
with "well...uh."

A

filled

Attempt

to

match information

to prior

knowledge of

target.

Repetition

Verbatim or paraphrased restatement.

Self-reference

Self-comparison, reference to

No comment

No comment made

self,

opinions.

or participant says "no

comment."

Discounting

Changing the valence of information or providing
an excuse for it.
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DISCUSSION
As

anticipated, relative to non-dependent participants,
evaluatively

dependent participants spent more time on

more information,

trait

information and discounted

particularly negative information.

These findings

substantiate the hypothesis that evaluatively dependent individuals
are

motivated to use potentially inaccurate processes to perceive an evaluator
protectively (positively).

an overall

Furthermore, these

effects occurred in the context of

positivity bias, across all participants,

dependency

self-

which was orthogonal

to the

effects.

Mediation?

The introduction argued
tremendous

that these biased processes result from the

loss of control experienced

by evaluated perceivers. This

control threatens self-esteem and produces anxiety.

loss of

In turn, self-esteem

threat and anxiety promote specific, positive biases in evaluated people’s

perceptions of their evaluators (see Figure

However,
differ

1).

in the experiment, evaluatively

dependent perceivers did not

from non-dependent perceivers on measures of perceived

control, self-

esteem threat, or anxiety. Even the individual difference measures of
self-esteem and relationship orientation did not influence perceivers’

trait

self-

esteem threat or anxiety.

One

could argue that the dependency manipulation was not effective;

the evaluation condition was not sufficiently threatening to the experimental
participants.

Yet, the

same dependency manipulation was used
33

successfully at

least twice before in the studies

paper

is

order to

based (Stevens

make

&

on which the theoretical reasoning

Fiske, 1995, Experiments 2 and

the evaluation

more

in this

In fact, in

3).

salient in this study, participants

were

informed that they would be receiving
their evaluation at the end of the
experimental session.
It is

more

likely that the

and anxiety measures was due

absence of effects on the self-esteem threat
to characteristics of the

The jittery-shaky-nervous emotion
triads.

was the seventh of nine emotion

triad

While there were no significant

measures themselves.

effects

triads, participants’ feelings of anxiety could

on the preceding emotion

have dissipated as they worked

through the questionnaire items. In addition, the second
state self-esteem
scale

was embedded

in a 26-item scale that has a correlation of .82 with
the

Self-Esteem Scale on which the state self-esteem measure was based
(Eagly,
1969).

Self-esteem effects could have been diluted across these 36 items.

Perhaps these measures need to be refined or disguised

in order to yield the

predicted effects.

In any case, these measures were added to the experimental procedure
after the think-aloud portion of the study.
effects

were present

for the think-aloud

As reviewed above, the predicted

measures

in the study.

However, the

addition of these measures seems to have interfered with the hypothesized
effects for the final questionnaire.

Biased Perceptions?

As

indicated, while this study replicated the attention

and discounting

biases found in the think aloud protocols of previous research (Stevens
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&

Fiske, 1995), additional effects were
not replicated and

not confirmed.

Based on previous research,

it

new hypotheses were

was predicted that an

incompetent other would be inaccurately perceived
as competent hy
evaluatively dependent participants.

were hypothesized

to desire a

In addition, low self-esteem participants

incompetent evaluator and task-oriented

participants were hypothesized to be particularly sensitive
to the evaluator’s

competency.

These

None
effects

of these effects occurred.

may have

disappeared because participants were able to

self-affirm via completion of the

mood measure

or the state self-esteem scale,

which both followed the think-aloud portion of the study. As discussed

in the

introduction, self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) argues that information

threatening the perceived adequacy or integrity of the self activates a
defensive goal to affirm the general integrity of the

accomplish this affirmation, people

may

affirm the broader self-concept or
,

important aspect of the

self.

The

may adapt

self.

self-

In order to

to the specific self-throat

,

may

affirm a different, but equally

self-esteem and

mood measures not

only

provided participants with a way to affirm their broader self-concept, but

esteem and mood (anxiety) were hypothesized
this evaluative context.

self-

to be the specific self-threat in

Affirmation would have eliminated the effects of

extreme control deprivation associated with being evaluatively dependent by
restoring an efficacious self-image.
trait effects disappeared.

Thus, the predicted perceived control and

Proposed Study

Because the perceived control and
opportunity to self-affirm on

though self-esteem or mood

we

also

know from

sensitive measures.

mood
is

disappear after the

or self-esteem measures,

it

appears as

important in an evaluative context. However,

this study that
It

trait effects did

measures of mood and state self-esteem are

would be advantageous

to conduct a study in

which

only half of the participants are given the
opportunity to complete the

and

state self-esteem measures.

If findings

study are replicated by the participants

from the Stevens and Fiske (1995)

who do

not complete the

state self-esteem measures, while the participants

and

state self-esteem

know

a

little

mood and

who do complete

measures mirror the participants

more about how mood and

mood

the

in this study,

mood

we

will

self-esteem affect the use of biased

processes of impression formation.
In conclusion, this research on

how

evaluated powerless people form

impressions of their evaluators does indicate that people are motivated
tacticians

who

take their goals into account before choosing strategies;

evaluatively dependent people choose different strategies than non-dependent
people.

Furthermore, we know that some strategies can be directionally

biased; evaluated people use positively biased strategies.
significantly, this research reveals

how much we do

not

underlying forces that guide these motivated tacticians.
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However, most

know about

the

appendix a
SELF-ESTEEM SCALE (TRAIT)
indicate the extent to which you agree
with each
!?!!!!
of
the following statements on the
scan sheet.

0

Strongly Disagree

1

= Disagree 2 = Agree 3 = Strongly
Agree

that I’m person of worth, at least on
equal basis with others.

1.

I

feel

2.

I

feel that

3.

All in

4.

I

am

5.

I

feel

6.

I

take a positive attitude toward myself.

7.

On

8.

I

wish

9.

I

certainly feel useless at times.

10.

I

have a number of good

am

all, I

inclined to feel that

qualities.

I

am

a failure.

able to do things as well as most other
people.
I

do not have much to be proud

the whole,
I

I

am

of.

satisfied with myself.

could have more respect for myself.

At times,

I

think

I

am

no good

at

all.

37

APPENDIX B
LEAST-PREFERRED COWORKER SCALE
People differ in the ways the think about those
with whom they work
be important in working with others. Please give
your immediate,
first reaction to the following items.
everyone with whom you have ever worked on a
common
task. Now, pick out the person with whom
you work least wpII This person
may be someone you work with now, or may be someone you
knew in the

This

may

past.

This person does not have to be the person you like least
well, but
should be the person with whom you had the most difficulty
in getting a job
done. Describe this person as he/she appears to you.

Look at the words at both ends of the line before you decide upon
your
answer. Please remember that there are no right or wrong answers
Work
rapidly; your first answer is likely to be the best. Please
do not omit any
items. Fill in the bubble on the scan sheet for the one
number you have
chosen for each item.
.

01234567

pleasant

01234567

friendly
rejecting

distant
cold

supportive

open

warm

01234567

01234567

01234567

harmonious

cheerful

guarded

01234567

untrustworthy
considerate

hostile

interesting

01234567

backbiting

close

01234567

quarrelsome

gloomy

accepting

relaxed

01234567

01234567

boring

unfriendly

01234567

01234567

tense

unpleasant

loyal

01234567

01234567

trustworthy

inconsiderate
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nasty

01234567

nice

agreeable

01234567

disagreeable

insincere

01234567

sincere

kind

01234567

unkind
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APPENDIX C
SELF-ESTEEM SCALE (STATE)

V?

Remember, your answers are

completely confidential.
^

with

1

2.

I

At

5.

At

1

7.

On

1

9.

I

think

I

I

I

am

1

am

4 Strongly Disagree
this

moment.

4 Strongly Disagree

a failure.
4 Strongly Disagree

do not have much to be proud
3 Disagree

4 Strongly Disagree

able to do things as well as

2 Agree

3 Disagree

of.

most people.

4 Strongly Disagree

take a positive attitude toward myself.

I

Strongly Agree
I

am

2 Agree
satisfied with

Strongly Agree

wish

I

Strongly Agree
I

think

3 Disagree

4 Strongly Disagree

myself at this moment.

2 Agree

3 Disagree

4 Strongly Disagree

could have more respect for myself.

Strongly Agree

Currently,

I

3 Disagree

2 Agree

Strongly Agree

I

that

2 Agree

certainly feel useless at this
1

10.

moment,

2 Agree

feel

I

Strongly Agree

Currently,

3 Disagree

inclined to feel that

moment,

the whole,
1

8.

am

I

Right now,

3 Disagree

2 Agree

Strongly Agree

this

1

6.

Strongly Agree

this

1

2 Agree

have a number of good qualities at

I

Right now,
1

4.

Strongly Agree

feel that

1

3.

^

^

otWs^’

I

Strongly Agree

3 Disagree

moment.

2 Agree

am

4 Strongly Disagree

3 Disagree

no good at

2 Agree

4 Strongly Disagree

all.

3 Disagree
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4 Strongly Disagree

APPENDIX D
STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT
SontGricGs Consistent with
I

Compotoncp

thought the TA had just the right amount of
persistence when trying
an idea to the class.

relate

The TA was

efficient

time.

I

thought the

TA

liked

how

and usually got the homework graded way ahead of

sometimes had yery clever answers to questions.

The TA appeared
I

to

to be relaxed during teaching.

quickly the

TA

went through the material without omitting any

important points.
Sentence s Consistent with Incompetence
I

thought the

TA was

sort of yague

The TA was sloppy and had

when

illegible

explaining things.

handwriting.

From the amount of preparation and the level of organization,
that the TA was an irresponsible instructor.
The TA took a

superficial

approach to teaching, not showing a

I

would say

lot of interest

in the participant.

In the discussion section, the

TA

spent a

details.
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lot of

time nitpicking at minor

APPENDIX E
EPSTEIN’S EMOTION TRIADS
Please indicate how you feel right
following groups of emotions:

not at

now by

circling a

number

all

for each of the

very

happy, cheerful,
OR joyous

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

angry, irritated,

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

unhappy, sad,
OR gloomy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

frightened, worried,

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

OR

OR

annoyed

threatened

energetic, aroused,

OR
tired,

keyed-up

weary,
OR unreactive

Jittery,

shaky,

OR

nervous

calm, relaxed,

OR

at ease

enthusiastic, alive,

OR

alert
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APPENDIX F
SELF-ESTEEM SCALE (STATE) WITHIN
FEELINGS OF INADEQUACY SCALE
Please indicate how you feel right now. Remember,
your answers are
completely confidential.
1.

Right now, do you

most of the people you know?

XXXXXXX

no

definitely

feel inferior to

At this moment, do you worry about
work?
2.

3.

Right now, do

no

definitely

4.

If

feel

you had

5.

At

no

no

definitely

to

do things as well as most people?

XXXXXXX
XXXXXXX
XXXXXXX
XXXXXXX
XXXXXXX
XXXXXXX

to read

an essay and understand

it

at this

definitely yes

moment, would you

it?

definitely yes

definitely yes

Currently, do you feel self-conscious?

no

definitely

7.

you are able

definitely yes

moment, do you feel confident that someday the people you know
up to you and respect you?

this

will look

6.

feel

worried or concerned about

definitely

might be made of your

XXX XXXX

no

definitely

criticisms that

definitely yes

Do you

certainly feel useless at this

no

definitely

definitely yes

moment?

definitely yes

things to

moment, do you think you would have trouble thinking
talk about if you were in a group?

definitely

no

8.

At

this

43

of the right

definitely yes

argument

gr
definitely

10.

your

X

no

would you

X

X

feel

to convince someone, who
may
concerned or worried about it?
it?

X

X

Currently, do you think you are
no good at

definitely

definitely

X

no

peoptV’’'^

12.

ideas,

X

X

X

no

X

X

well

X

definitely yes

X

X

definitely yes

you get along with other

X

X

that you are a worthless individual at this

X

no

X

X

all?

X

moment, do you worry about how

Do you think

definitely

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

definitely yes

moment?

X

definitely yes

Currently, do you feel afraid or anxious about
going into a room by
yourself where other people have already gathered
and are talking?
13.

definitely

14.

Do you

definitely

X

no
feel

X

that you have a

no

X

X

X

X

number

X

X

X

X

X

of good qualities at this

X

X

X

Currently, would you have trouble expressing your ideas
put them into writing?
15.

definitely

16.

no

X

X

X

X

definitely yes

X

X

X

moment?

definitely yes

if

you

tried to

definitely yes

Right now, do you worry about whether other people will regard you as a

success or failure?
definitely

17.

no

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

definitely yes

Currently, do you wish you could have more respect for yourself?

definitely

no

XXXXXXX
XXXXXXX

definitely yes

Currently, do you feel so discouraged with yourself that you wonder
whether you are a worthwhile person?
18.

definitely

no
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definitely yes

scholastic ability than

definitely
20.

At

this

definitely

21.

moment, would you

X

no

X

X

no

X

X

feel

X

X

X

X

X

definitely yes

new

X

people?
definitely yes

that you are a failure?

feel

X

X

X

X

definitely yes

X

no

X

X

X

no

X

X

X

X

X

X

definitely yes

at this

X

X

X

definitely yes

moment?

X

X

no

X

X

X

X

you turned in a major assignment
excellent job on it?

right now,

X

X

If

definitely

no

X

Do you feel worried
this moment?

26.

at

X

Right now, do you take a positive attitude toward yourself?

definitely
25.

X

uncomfortable meeting

X

Are you troubled with shyness

definitely
24.

X

Right now, do you dislike yourself?

definitely
23.

X

Right now, are you inclined to

definitely
22.

X

no

definitely

no

X

X

or bothered about

X

X

would you

X

X

definitely yes
feel

you did an

definitely yes

what other people think about you

XXXXXXX
XXXXXXX
XXXXXXX
XXXXXXX

definitely yes

you made an embarrassing mistake or did something that
makes you look foolish, would it take you a long time to get over it?
27.

Right now,

definitely

28.

Are you

definitely

29.

no

no

if

satisfied

with yourself at the moment?

Right now, do you

definitely

no

definitely yes

feel

definitely yes

confident about your abilities?

45

definitely yes

worried about whether other people
31.
definitely

no

^

^

^

^

X

like to

X

be with

definitely yes

Currently, do you feel that you are a
person of worth, at least on an
equal basis with others.
definitely

32.

no

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

definitely yes

Right now, would you have trouble understanding
things you read?

definitely

no

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

definitely yes

Right now, if you thought that some of the people
you meet might have
an unfavorable opinion of you, would you feel concerned
or worried about it?
33.

definitely
34.

X

X

X

X

X

Currently, do you have the feeling that there

definitely

35.

no

At

no

this

definitely

X

X

moment, do you

no

X

X

X
feel

X

X

X
is

X

X

definitely yes

nothing you can do well?

X

you do not have much

X

X

X

X
to be

X

definitely yes

proud

of?

definitely yes

Currently, compared with classmates, do you feel you must study more
than they do to get the same grades?
36.

definitely

no

XXXXXXX

46

definitely yes

APPENDIX G

EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE
Part

I

Please answer the following questions honestly.
Your answers are completely
confidential.

How

well do you think you will do on the task?

not very well

How

123456789

10

11

very well

well does the work-study person expect to do in the discussion?

not very well

How much

12345 6789

10

11

very well

control do you feel you will have over your outcomes in this

experiment?
very

little

How much

You have
you

2

received

will discuss

not very

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11a

lot

this experiment?

1

little

3

control do you feel the work-study student will have over your

outcomes in
very

2

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

a lot

some information about the work-study person with whom
ideas. Do you think this information will be helpful?

your

123456789

10

11

very helpful

helpful
If

you were participating

less info

experiment again, would you

123456789

about the
work-study

How

in this

10

11

like:

more

the same

inconsistent or consistent

info

about the
work-study

amount

was the information you received about the

work-study student?
very

123456789

10

11

very
consistent

inconsistent
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information you received about the work-

123456789

very

10

11

positive

How

unclear or clear

very unclear

1

2

very
negative

your impression of the work-study person?

is

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

very

Does the work-study person seem:
Competent,
not very

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

very

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

very

not very

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

very

Outgoing,
not very

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

very

Honest.
not very

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

very

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

very

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

very

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

very

Hard-working,
not very 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

very

Nervous.
not very

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

very

Likable.

not very
Lazy.

Friendly.

not very
Irresponsible,

not very
Loyal.

not very

How

1

happy or unhappy do you

you’ll be discussing

very

feel

about having this person as the person

your ideas with?

123456789

10

11

very

unhappy

happy
48

Who

will

be evaluating your performance

What kind
and

in

order to give away the prizes?

of things do you think will influence

how

well

in the evaluation?

Part

II

Based on what you remember from the explanation given
briMly describe what you are getting ready to work on.

We

you do on the task

earlier, please

are always interested in any comments, ideas, questions, or predictions
people have about our studies. If you have any, please describe them below.
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ENDNOTES
The
were

six deleted participants

in the

were distributed across conditions: Four

no dependency-positive expectancy condition,
none were

in the

no

dependency-negative expectancy condition, one was in the
evaluative
dependency-positive expectancy condition, and one was
in the evaluative

dependency-negative expectancy condition.

The Feelings

of Inadequacy Scale simply

was used

second presentation of the State Self-Esteem Scale and
in

to disguise the

will

not be discussed

any further.
^

Only those questionnaire items that yielded

significant effects are

discussed in the results section.

Five additional expectancy main effects also served as manipulation
checks.

Participants expecting a positive other indicated that the information

they received was
negative other

less negative

(M =

(M =4.75) than

6.29), F(l,107)

=

16.46,

participants expecting a

MSE =

3.99,

p <

.0005.

Participants expecting a positive other also rated the other more competent

(M =

7.47),

more

likable

(M =

7.33),

more outgoing (M =

6.98),

and

nervous (M =

3.56) than participants expecting a negative other

M

5.45,

=6.66,

3.71,

p <

MSE =

M

and

M

.0001, F(l,107)

=

2.78,

=

p <

=

6.91, respectively), F(l,107)

=

4.55,

.0005, F(l,107)

=

2.67,

61.07,

p <

=

.05,

5.07,

=

p <

(M =

18.13,

F(l,107)

less

=

5.91,

MSE =
23.66,

.0001,

respectively.
^

A

valence by expectation interaction indicated that participants
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who

expected the other to be positive
had a larger difference between
time spent

on negative (M = 76.02) and

who

participants
positive

M

=

positive

(M =

61.19) information than

expected the other to be negative
(negative

66.04), F(l,106)

=

5.49,

MSE

=

145.90, p

<

M

=

73.29,

.05.

Other operationalizations of self-esteem
threat were investigated and
the results of those analyses did
not differ from the presented analyses.
’

Using only the discounting comments made
about negative information

did not affect the results.
®

A

measure of

trait anxiety also

was

available from the prescreening

questionnaire. Although no hypotheses were

exploratory analyses were conducted.

meaningful
^

None

made about

trait anxiety,

of these analyses yielded any

effects.

Moderator

effects

were also investigated using regression analyses and

the results did not differ from those of the

ANOVAs.

Participants expecting a positive other also seemed

more comfortable

commenting on the valence of the information; they made more

comments (M =
2.40), F(l,106)

More

4.29) than participants expecting a negative other

=

6.95,

=

elaborations were

7.05,

p <

made by

p <

.05.

(M =

.01.

evaluative participants

than by non-dependent participants (M =
18.51,

evaluative

6.64), F(l,106)

=

(M =

5.20,

9.29)

MSE =

Furthermore, a dependency by valence interaction indicated

that while both non-dependent and evaluatively dependent participants both

made more

elaborations about the negative information

5.76, respectively)

(M =

than the positive information (M = 2.76 and

51

3.87 and

M

=

M

3.53,

=

respectively), this difference

participants, F(l,106)

=

was

5.92,

larger for evaluatively dependent

MSE

=

2.99,

p <

.05.

Once

again,

many

of

these elaborations were also discounting
comments.

In addition, two main effects indicated
that evaluatively dependent
participants

(M =

0.58)

participants

(M =

0.28), F(l,106)

made more

attribute connections than non-dependent

=

6.17,

MSE

=

participants expecting a positive fictitious other

p <

0.83,

(M =

0.57)

.05,

and that

made more

attribute connections than participants expecting
a negative fictitious other

(M —

0.29), F(l,106)

=

5.47,

MSE

=

0.83,

p <

.05.

Again, in these

statements, participants highlighted the negative information’s
disagreement

with the positive information. Both participants expecting a positive

fictitious

other and participants being evaluated appeared to have positive
expectations
for the other person.

An

expectation by valence interaction indicated that the same

of hedges about the positive information were

made by

number

participants expecting

a positive other and participants expecting a negative other (M = 3.45 and

=

3.62, respectively).

many more hedges

However, participants expecting a positive other made

about the negative information (M = 4.71) than

participants expecting a negative other
2.43,

p <

.005.

M

(M =

3.67), F(l,106)

Participants expecting a positive other

surprised unpleasantly by the negative information.
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=

8.27,

MSE =

may have been
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